
Far right on the march and LulaâÂÂs failures: key drivers of Flávio BolsonaroâÂÂs Brazil surge
Experts say strength of evangelical church and perception that Lula is too old also helped propel Jair BolsonaroâÂÂs son to first-round election win
On Sunday night, as the scale of the far-right triumph in Brazil sank in, an adapted football chant rang out in one of RioâÂÂs most leftwing areas.
âÂÂLetâÂÂs turn this around, Lu-laaaaa! LetâÂÂs turn this around, Lu-laaaaa! LetâÂÂs turn this around, Lu-laaaaa!â crestfallen progressives bellowed while drowning their sorrows after witnessing an excruciating election setback for their leader, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.
But the scale of the challenge facing the veteran leftist looks immense after Flávio BolsonaroâÂÂs shock first-round win, which analysts attribute to a complex lattice of social, political and religious phenomena.
âÂÂFlávio BolsonaroâÂÂs result shows that Bolsonarismo is a far-right movement ⦠that has put down deep roots in Brazilian society,â said Bernardo Mello Franco, a political columnist for the Rio broadsheet O Globo. âÂÂHis father [Jair Bolsonaro] was convicted and jailed for attempting a coup dâÂÂétat [in 2022-23] yet despite this, his allies won elections across the country, and his son is the frontrunner in the second round of the presidential election.âÂÂ
Among the main drivers behind BolsonaroâÂÂs strong showing:
1. The evangelical church
BrazilâÂÂs evangelical church has expanded dramatically since the 1980s, with evangelical Christians now making up nearly a third of the population.
Many evangelical voters â often influenced by church leaders â have thrown their weight behind the radical populist movement built by Jair Bolsonaro, and now spearheaded by his evangelical eldest son. As president from 2018 to 2022, BolsonaroâÂÂs ultra-conservative policies helped him cement a lasting alliance with powerful megachurch leaders such as the televangelist Silas Malafaia.
âÂÂThis religious machine ⦠was put at the service of Bolsonarismo: starting with these pastors who have millions of followers on social media, who buy airtime on TV, who lead churches with millions of members, and who turned themselves into canvassers for the Bolsonaro family,â said Mello Franco.
2. Urban violence
Mello Franco believed urban violence was another factor that had turbocharged the âÂÂfar-right windstormâ sweeping Brazil.
Rightwing populists such as the pro-gun Bolsonaros were offering voters âÂÂmisguided but easy-to-understand solutionsâ to high crime rates, such as increased police violence, mass incarceration and lowering the age of criminal responsibility. âÂÂThis appeals to an electorate that is scared of violence and crime,â Mello Franco said.
The leading light of such âÂÂsecurity populismâ in Latin America is El SalvadorâÂÂs authoritarian president, Nayib Bukele, who has jailed thousands of people, often without due process, in his successful bid to cut murder rates. Mello Franco said El SalvadorâÂÂs âÂÂproto-dictatorâ and his supposedly âÂÂmagic solutionsâ had been held up as an inspiration by Bolsonarista politicians during the 2026 campaign.
Such hardline proposals have also been boosted by Donald TrumpâÂÂs decision to designate BrazilâÂÂs two biggest crime groups, RioâÂÂs Red Command and São PauloâÂÂs PCC, as foreign terrorist organizations. On the campaign trail, Bolsonaro and his allies have vowed to âÂÂneutralize narco-terroristsâ and chemically castrate rapists â promises that appear to have won over many violence-weary voters.
3. LulaâÂÂs campaign
Analysts say LulaâÂÂs failure to focus on day-to-day issues such as crime may have hurt his prospects.
The leftwing veteran spent much of the campaign vowing to defend BrazilâÂÂs sovereignty from Donald TrumpâÂÂs âÂÂcolonialâ designs and protect its rare earth reserves. âÂÂMeanwhile, what voters wanted were solutions to more immediate problems such as bank debts, the cost of food, and insecurity,â Mello Franco said.
During one recent rally in suburban Rio, some Lula supporters visibly zoned out as the president waxed lyrical about critical minerals and artificial intelligence.
Political analyst Thomas Traumann, who was spokesperson for the former leftwing president Dilma Rousseff, believed LulaâÂÂs third administration had ignored a large chunk of society that was unsatisfied over economic issues or because of controversies involving the supreme court.
âÂÂThe government treated any kind of criticism ⦠as a display of fascism â which undoubtedly exists in Brazil â and elitism, which also exists,â he said. âÂÂBut what also exists is a group of voters who expected more from the government and who are neither fascists, nor elitists. They are simply people who didnâÂÂt like the government and decided to punish it.âÂÂ
4. A Brazilian Biden?
Some critics have also pointed to LulaâÂÂs age as his achilles heel and blame him for failing to produce an obvious successor. He will turn 81 two days after the electionâÂÂs 25 October second round. One recent story in the Economist called Lula âÂÂa doddering leftieâ and compared him to the âÂÂgeriatric leaderâ Joe Biden, who was forced to abandon his 2024 re-election campaign after a disastrous debate performance against Trump.
Traumann called questions over LulaâÂÂs physical or mental state âÂÂridiculousâÂÂ. âÂÂWhen you see him speak, you can tell itâÂÂs not about this,â he said of the gym-going octogenarian.
Mello Franco agreed: âÂÂUnlike Biden, Lula has at no point shown any kind of physical frailty or cognitive impairment. I donâÂÂt think this was an issue.âÂÂ
But Traumann did see one parallel with the former US president: like Biden, Lula was stubborn, had not listened enough to others, and appeared to have thought decent economic indicators were enough to ensure re-election. âÂÂThis disconnection from reality reminds me of Biden,â he said, attributing it to âÂÂthe stubbornness of ageâÂÂ.
From the start of the campaign, Lula seemed to believe âÂÂthe election was in the bagâÂÂ.
âÂÂAnd it wasnâÂÂt,â Traumann said.
5. The global far right
Many observers saw SundayâÂÂs rightwing victory as another chapter in the global advance of the social media-savvy far right.
âÂÂWeâÂÂre seeing this revolution in many other parts of the world. WeâÂÂre seeing this in the US, weâÂÂre seeing it in parts of Latin America, weâÂÂre see this in a different way in Europe,â said Miguel Lagos, a political scientist.
Lagos believed that in Brazil, the movement was driven by a deep âÂÂrage against the classical political elitesâ including journalists, traditional politicians and intellectuals.
Jair Bolsonaro and his son Flávio are career politicians. Between them, they have spent half a century working in RioâÂÂs state legislature or the Brazilian congress. Even so, father and son have managed to portray themselves as Trump-style anti-establishment outsiders who have come to drain a swamp of which they, too, are part.
Mello Franco believed Bolsonaro was now the favourite to become president. âÂÂBut I donâÂÂt think the contest is over,â he cautioned. âÂÂBrazil is always showing us that plot twists arenâÂÂt just possible â theyâÂÂre practically part of the landscape.âÂÂ
