Attacks on Saudi oil expose Iraqi PM’s struggle to control armed factions

As black smoke billowed over Saudi Arabia’s East-West oil pipeline, the repercussions of the drone attack were already reaching across the border into Iraq.

The strikes, launched from Iraqi territory, threatened about 4 percent of global oil supplies and helped push Brent crude above $108 a barrel. But they also presented Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi with perhaps the clearest test yet of his pledge to bring armed groups under state control as the US-led coalition is due to make its final withdrawal by September 30.

Who was behind the strikes?

No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks launched last Thursday. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella of pro-Iranian factions including Kataib Hezbollah, has denied involvement, calling the strike “an honour that we do not claim”.

Baghdad has confirmed the drones came from Iraqi soil. Security forces identified launch traces near the Duwayrij River in Maysan province’s al-Tayeb border area on Saturday. Lieutenant General Saad Maan, head of Iraq’s Security Media Cell, said an intelligence task force had seized a launch platform.

A senior source at the Ministry of Interior told Al Jazeera he believed a resistance splinter group was responsible, though this has not been confirmed. If true, it points to a deeper problem: factions operating outside the state’s chain of command, and subgroups that operate outside the factions’ control.

Michael Knights, a research lead at Washington-based consultancy Horizon Engage, was sceptical, noting that front groups are an old ploy to make reluctant governments think twice before retaliating.

He said it was probably a cell run directly by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or one of the established armed factions. “They just want to make it marginally harder for anyone to pin it on them,” he said.

Balancing act

Under international pressure, Zaidi has responded quickly. He sacked the Maysan operations commander, ordered the formation of an investigative committee to look into the incident and closed numerous border crossings with Iran to prevent perpetrators from fleeing. In a visual display, heavily armed troops in Humvees appeared on Maysan’s streets.

But to many observers, such moves are just a show to placate Saudi and US calls for action, as the September attack was not the first originating from Iraqi soil.

In July, drones launched from Iraq struck Saudi oil facilities, reportedly with help from Houthi fighters based in Iraq. The US and Saudi Arabia retaliated with strikes that killed more than 20 members of Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), including Iranian military advisers. The resulting diplomatic fallout forced al-Zaidi to postpone a planned trip to Riyadh.

The violence is threatening to undermine Iraq and Saudi Arabia’s warming relations. Riyadh froze ties after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, re-engaging in the mid-2010s as ISIL rose. Border crossings reopened in 2020, and talk has since turned to investment, electricity links and transport. Saudi intelligence chief Khalid al-Humaidan visited Baghdad this month, and Riyadh has held off retaliating against the September 10 attack at Zaidi’s request.

Lahib Higel, deputy director for the Middle East and North Africa at the International Crisis Group, said the strike may also have been a message to al-Zaidi, who has pursued greater engagement with Saudi Arabia as part of a wider strategy to diversify Iraq’s economy.

“What he’s doing with the Saudis now, I think they would be seriously concerned about,” she said of the factions, some of which have said avenging fighters killed in Saudi strikes matters more than business deals. More broadly, for fear of losing leverage, Iran and its associated factions do not want to see Iraq become less economically reliant on Tehran, or establish alternative oil export routes other than Hormuz.

Zaidi has attempted to balance relations with his neighbours, receiving Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in August just shy of a month after the Iraqi Prime Minister made an official visit to Tehran, where he met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.

The balancing act has put the prime minister, a multimillionaire business figure who was considered a compromise candidate of the governing Shia bloc, under pressure despite reportedly being a preferred option for the US.

A long list of attempts

Zaidi’s stated intent is clear. He has ordered Iraqi banks to enforce US sanctions on Lebanon’s Hezbollah, asked parliament to draft a law to put weapons under the control of the state, and said those who refuse to disarm will be tried for treason.

But enforcement has repeatedly been thwarted. In July, troops sent to search Harakat al-Nujaba’s compound south of Baghdad were turned away with warning shots. In August, counterterrorism forces arrested Abbas al-Yaqoubi, a senior Nujaba intelligence official, only for a judge to free him 48 hours later.

However, a Baghdad court did jail a Kataib Hezbollah member for 15 years over the March kidnapping of US journalist Shelly Kittleson.

Higel said Zaidi had been bolder than former prime ministers, and that such verdicts make low-level fighters ask whether an operation is “worth 15 years”.

“But in the bigger picture, this has essentially no meaningful impact,” she said. “It’s not a system that is changing.”

Three factions – Kataib Hezbollah, Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada – still refuse to disarm. Very few observers of Iraqi politics believe any meaningful concessions will be made, and the state has shown no sign it is willing to face off with the pro-Iranian factions.

A crisis of confidence

For Knights, whether the state can act is less about firepower than nerve.

He points out that attacking Saudi Arabia was the move most likely to draw US attention back onto faction leaders – but they did it anyway. “That says to me [the armed factions] are completely fearless right now.”

Knights believes that Iraq’s Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) had the operational capability to take out the leaders of most of Iraq’s armed factions if it had the support of Iraq’s leadership, Washington and its Gulf neighbours.

But few officials have faith in the US coming to Iraq’s support, if needed. As Saudi Arabia’s call for US assistance fighting the Houthis in Yemen has reportedly gone unheeded, Baghdad may be doubtful Washington would come to its aid if the Green Zone, Iraq’s fortified government district, was besieged by resistance factions.

“This is all about confidence and feeling like your partners have your back and nobody feels like that right now,” he said.

Higel said the factions believe time is on their side and can wait out Trump. The objective for al-Zaidi may be to appear bold enough to keep Washington and Riyadh happy without provoking a backlash that could topple his government, or worse.

“I wouldn’t put it past these groups to assassinate a prime minister if it came to it,” she said.